Q & A session at Uniting for the Future : Learning from each other’s experiences 2 September 2013 / Morning

Q & A session at Uniting for the Future : Learning from each other’s experiences 2 September 2013 / Morning

วันที่นำเข้าข้อมูล 12 Sep 2013

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Moderator:
Thank you, Ms.Hayner. Again you have reinforced previous presentations. Reconciliation should not be rushed, it should be a process. It takes time. It should be genuine and robust. And you also have weighted into the fray a little bit here by bringing up the amnesty. This is very much the sticking point for us in Thailand. In the other presentations, you can look at the world, in the other countries but the amnesty here in Thailand is very controversial. Now the floor is open for questions and comments. I will recognize you and then you can seek a microphone and ask the question. Now in the first round, I would like to give an opportunity for all three speakers, Ms. Hayner, Mr. Ahtisaari and Mr. Blair to perhaps react to the other comments that you have heard.

First I also would like to post initial round of the questions, perhaps for you to elaborate some of the themes that you have touched on and now that you have heard the other presentations. From
Mr. Blair’s speech, his remarks I think is very instructive for us. Your first point is that there is a shared future and opportunity that has to be recognized. We have to understand that it is a shared opportunity. The common theme from all presentations: What do we do about the past?  Nationally we have had different colors doing different things. We have everything from taking over government house, closing down the airport to burning Bangkok, central Bangkok buildings. The different sides see different reality, different past. You mentioned that this could be examined, but not judged, and not make judgment to satisfy everyone, because that won’t be possible. You brought up how these all have to be operationalized, third principle,
that you have to have a framework for the future or how do you cooperate in the future.

And fourth, genuine democracy means the right mixed collaboration of majority - minority relations. In Thailand we have this big problem and I can tell you that one-sided majority, one say when power is a winner takes all game as you eluted to. You have elections, electoral power and that’s it, you can do anything you like so the minority has this concern. They aren’t willing to go along because of the past abuses and so on.

In the process the minority can also hold the entire system hostage and that’s why we have stucked and minority won’t play along because they have lost the game. Majority wins the game and wants to take over and dictates all outcomes. And this recalibration that we need between majority and minority is critical.
Now that finally, the fifth point that you brought up is very telling and relevant to our situation. The political system, the political process and the politics has to be effective and responsive.

So in the past you can take a look at that and then you will understand it. The past you can dig into and you can do check and balance. But you can’t make everybody happy.

And the third point that Mr. Tony Blair mentioned that there must be a framework of cooperation in the future. There must be a way in which you can move. When you want to agree, how you will cooperate and move forward.

The fourth point is that it must be a true democracy, not just simply a winning of election and then after winning, you can ignore everybody else. The majority must listen to the minority and the relationship between the majority and minority must be balanced and accepted.
And lastly, Mr. Blair has said that the political system must be responsive and effective so they can be checked and it must be effective. There is a wide-spread perception that our elective politicians do not really function well. They win their offices and we don’t see them very much. And you brought up the subject of corruption. There’s a perception that our politician could perform much better and that we are beset with endemic corruption problems; and hence people don’t have a lot of faith in the system.

Now my question to you before I proceed to the question to Mr. Ahtisaari is that who should host this kind of dialogue and process. The Good Friday Agreement, your government was far-sighted and somewhat enlightened really to make concessions that cost you a lot, I think, politically at the time. I was studying in the UK. Very controversial a lot of risk earlier in your government, earlier in your career, I mean your leadership. And if it has stumbled, you could have taken some missteps. So who should host and who should own? I mean this form that we have being hosted by us a little bit. The government would like to own it and would like to also host it. Do we need a third party or some kind of an outside party and if so, who can that be around here? Does it have to be foreigner? If it is indigenous, then which side do we look to for fair hearing and fair process?

Mr. Ahtisaari, your very succinct cases; Namibia, Aceh and Kosovo. We really appreciate your point about the past is not to be forgotten. Reconciliation is not about forgetting the past but seeing the future, different kinds of future that we must see. The Aceh case, there was a tsunami, the Boxing day tsunami in 2004, I think that is something that you can elaborate on. That was really the turning point. I think it has been accepted, without the tsunami, we would not have had the agreement between Indonesian Government and GAM.

So we don’t want to have another Tsunami here because it’s tragic, lot of people perished. But what would be the equivalent of exogenous factor that could really uplift and make us get over this hump. I mean if not Tsunami then what can we look for that can be the catalyst for peace process and reconciliation in Thailand.
And for Ms. Hayner, many points you brought up and I think I will have to ask you about the amnesty because you went into some detail. Who should discover and is it indispensible without some kind of an amnesty or pardon program?  In Northern Ireland, there was release of prisoners that was a key. In Thailand, do we have to release people? And if so, how wide should the net be casted, cover everyone or some? Where do we draw the line? It is very difficult for us.
So first Mr. Blair perhaps. Who should host?

Mr. Blair:
Well, first of all, thank you so much for that excellent summary of my speech. It is nice to know that you were listening.

Sometimes in the Northern Ireland process or in the Middle East process you involve outsiders, at certain point, you can do that. But in the end, things are gonna resolved by the people who are intimately connected with the dispute. Two things I would say about this. I think, obviously about who host, you can debate that. You can have your type of institution that can host it if you can find obviously the more objective the people who are hosting, it seems the better and so on.

But I should think two things that I would add additionally which I think really matter and is
a very practical thing, by the way.

The first is that you need also to find forums in which people can speak very frankly to each other without it is necessarily becoming huge political issues. I had, in Northern Ireland many times, I would meet people quite privately actually. And without them thinking that if they were speaking to me it was not gonna become a big media story. And you found you gathering email traffic from the event. These things become very divisive. People shout in a very loud way nowadays. Everything is conducted in a high volume. But you need to find ways that the key people can have a dialogue that is quite private where they also establish some personal relationships. I found in all of the reconciliation work I have been involved in; you need the key people to establish some sort of personal relationship in it.

And second thing is I found both what President Atisaari and Priscilla said about very interesting elements that go into reconciliation. In the end this got to be a basic will and if that will is not there, there is really nothing you can do. Because even you got any amount of process, any amount of different items, but you have got to have a will to overcome the differences or to end up in the situation where you know you can manage to find the will to get rid of the things that can stand in your way even it is quite costly. I remember towards the very end of the negotiations of the Good Friday Agreement, we got the position where the unionist, there was a particular building the government had used, that they held many talks and all were failed. And they came to hate this building. And the building was called “Mary Field.” And they insisted that it was to be shut. Now when they first came to see me, because of the Northern Ireland accent, it was quite unusual and they said to me that they required Mary Field to be shut, Mary Field being the home of Scottish rugby. They gave me this demand that I thought they meant where the Scottish rugby holds their big matches as I have to shut the stadium for some reason. By that time, I was prepared to do it if they brought peace, but I did not quite know why they were asking for it. It was finally understood that, by mentioning the Mary Field, it’s not the rugby place, they actually meant this building. In the end, the other people wanted to keep it. We just have to find the way through. And if that will is not there, there is nothing you can do because by the way there were fifteen different things that you can use to sink the reconciliation. Any of these things can be used to do it so you got to decide on the psychologically first that it’s sufficiently important.

And finally, language matters in these situations. If you want to reconcile, you have got to try to speak with some understanding of the other person’s narrative about the situation.

Another thing that is quite interesting is that all three of us in a way were saying, you never gonna change people’s thinking about what happened in the past. That narrative is not gonna changed. What can happen is you can agree of each of the narrative that you want to overcome in the future. And the language you use in the process of reconciliation is extremely important because it can indicate sensitivity or it can indicate obstinacy. And obviously it happens that it indicates the sensitivity.

One of the things I constantly say about the Middle East peace process is that it never works unless the language each side uses about the other gives some sense that even if you may not agree with their narrative, you at least understand why they are saying it. And that can obviously help bring people together.

Moderator:
You and your government engaged in peace talk with the IRA and Sinn Féin. As the Thai government is trying to promote the reconciliation forum such as this, what they have to do to cultivate a sense of trust from the other side?

Mr. Blaire:
One thing I’ve learnt along political life is that you should not to tell people how to run their own business. So I can’t tell you what I think that the Thai government should do. They goanna have to work that out for themselves. For me what I can say is what I had even learnt from elsewhere. But I found when I came to power, for example, my political party had a long standing policy for a united Ireland. I realized there was no way we could be seen as an objective helper of this process, when the heart of the issue was united Ireland or not, if my own political party had a policy of free united Ireland. How I would be perceived as an objective. So I actually changed that policy very deliberately. So, I tried to clear a lot of the obstacles out of the way and I was also trying to be very honest about the feelings of British government in the past.

So, I think my advice to any governments in this situation is to try so far as possible to put yourself in the other persons’ shoes and then try to go a little bit towards them. If you don’t and if it’s not the sense of reaching out then it’s very hard. That means the people on the other side got to be prepared to reach back.
That’s why I say in the end it’s going to be the will and you talked earlier what type of forums. I think lots of different forums you can have but I think it was really important as well that a sense from the people comes out that they say to the politicians. Look! The people don’t get involve into the details, it’s my experience, but they do get involved in the sentiment, in the feeling. If the people are there saying sort it out, then I think politicians would like to achieve that and do it. I can’t and it would not be appropriate for me to start telling the government or the opposition what they should do. But I think it’s fairly clear if you really want reconciliation, you have to try and find the way of reaching out towards each other.

Moderator:
Thank you. There are more questions for you by the way so we will come back for you shortly. Mr. Ahtisaari before you will be asked about the catalyst, about the Tsunami in Aceh. There is a question from the floor related to your presentation about the role of education: how education can promote, perhaps to the extent that it can promote reconciliation. I would like to recognize Mr. Alain ... go ahead and ask your question.

Moderator (helped repeating the question to Mr. Ahtisaari) :
So the question is how can education play a role in reconciliation? And also within the Thai context? 

Ahtisaari:
Before I answer any questions, I would like to tell a story about my experience, very intriguing one in Northern Ireland and in South African. I got, all of sudden, a call when I visited South Africa from Cyril Ramaphosa, my friend. We both worked in Northern Ireland and inspected a number of IRA’s arms dumps. 

What Cyril had to tell me was that “Would it be possible for your government to invite the different political parties from Iraq to come to Finland and we would choose three people from the opposite parties, from South African peace process and Northern Ireland?” So they collected people and sent three ANC (African National Congress), three IRA (Irish Republican Army) - republicans and unionist, 3 poles. So there were twelve people many of whom have been branded terrorism in the past. Their task was to meet the Iraqis and tell what mistake they have made so that Iraqis could avoid the same. Then they withdrew, let the Iraqis speak and the Iraqis agreed on a number of things. And when they voted very carefully after few months, they even signed in parliament an agreement. Not that this brought peace, but I thought it was a marvelous contribution of those who have been going through these processes.

Now, how much did Tsunami influence? Of course, it did help if hundred and seventy thousand people died and international community is extremely generous. Everyone realizes that if you can’t actually make peace, you can’t utilize that money that generously offers funding for reconstruction of the society. It definitely helped. But I think we would have made peace, it might have taken longer. Indonesian government wanted to show the VDO about the Tsunami and its damages done in Aceh. GAM delegation did not want to see it. They refused to see it in the place where I held the talks. The machinery unfortunately did not function. I had not broken it but it simply did not function, so we never saw that VDO. So that took care of that.

think the mere fact that there have been negotiation for cessation of hostility in Aceh with well organization by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and this was lasted for three years. Agreement lasted for only half a year. But I must say that those negotiations also helped because people met so many times and despite the fact that the ceasefire did not hold, it definitely helped. But again elections helped in Indonesia because there was a new government which was determined to make peace in Aceh. Had that not happened, it would have been much more complicated. So, there were many positive factors that helped.

I think education is absolutely important. Let’s look at the Balkans. Tony Blair has referred to that.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are three history books. One for Serbs, one for Croats and one for Serbians. It reminds me the negotiation I was sharing with David Owen and Cyrus Vance as the chairman of Bosnia-Herzegovina Working Group in Geneva. When they wanted to talk to me, they presented the totally different picture of what had happened in the past. They went back few hundred years and it was not very exciting to listen to them

But this is the fact of life and I think when I listened to the discussion about the amnesty or how to deal with the past, I think one thing we have to achieve in the peace negotiation and peace agreement is that we get to start for the new beginning that none of the atrocities that were happening could never occur in the society again. That is a sort of half victory.

My advice for reconciliation would be I know it has been encouraged by Tony Blair and his colleagues as well in Northern Ireland. It started with small; started in local communities, more informal. Because when people get together as they used to before the fighting started, they can’t come back. There are different groups including the religious one who has played an extremely useful role in most of the conflicts on local level.

In Aceh, in our agreement we discussed that there should be a new court for human rights and truth and reconciliation commission. None of these has happened.
Sometimes I think that in this sort of conflict situation, it is important that first the reconciliation takes place between central government and local government. They have to learn to work with each other. My organization - Crisis Management Initiative stayed seven years in Aceh and in Indonesia. Then I told them that this is enough. We are not helping you anymore because you turn to us instead of talking to each other. You have to learn to solve the practical problems.
I said farewell. They would have liked us to stay forever but I said it is counter-productive.

If you want to consult us, me and my colleagues, you know our telephone number in Finland. But we will disappear and I think they have learnt to deal with difficult issues. That fastened the reconciliation process as well. There are so many elements in the reconciliation and I think we have to recognize all the possibility we can have and hopefully at the end of the day in Bosnia Herzegovina, there is one history book.

Moderator:
Thank you Mr. Ahtisaari before we go to Ms. Hayner, there’s a question from the floor relates to the amnesty. I recognize Erich Parpart.

Erich Parpart (United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship : UDD) :
If the Amnesty Bill in Thailand that has currently been discussed in the parliament and it was done according to the international practice, can it help promote reconciliation in Thailand? or do you have any other ideas?

Moderator:
So there are two related questions for you Ms. Hayner.  Do we need an Amnesty Bill? And how / why should it cover? The version that we have now being debated in parliament. I don’t know
if you have seen the detail of it, but do you think it is on the right track?

Ms.Hayner:
Thank you very much, the question for Amnesty in any context will always be difficult and will often be very controversial. And part of the difficulty is that there’s no clear answer to the questions that you’re putting forward. That there is only a few general guidelines from the international legal side as to what should or shouldn’t be included in the Amnesty, and even there, it’s not crystal clear where the line would be drawn. So if you try to apply those guidelines to the context of Thailand, it only provides a little bit of help. And I don’t, as I tried to suggest very briefly earlier, I don’t believe that that should be the primary starting point and certainly not the ending point to answer the question that you have put forward.

In the sense when you look at Amnesty models and processes in different countries, you can ask a number of different questions. You can ask as Thitinan has put: ‘Who should be covered?’, or ‘What crimes should be covered’. And in fact, it is possible, and it may well be recommended in the context where the numbers are relatively small, in terms of possible persons covered. It may be possible to identify exactly who would be covered, or certainly to be much more precise, as to exactly what crimes would be covered by the amnesty. The version that I have seen, and it’s a translation, so of course there’s always room for difference there, but it wasn’t perfectly clear to me, from the language as it was starting in the first reading exactly where the line would be drawn on some of those questions, so it seems to me that it would be useful to provide and to find more clarity, as to exactly what would be covered by the amnesty.

A third question is a procedural aspect of, as I said earlier, how will such an amnesty be applied. Is it something that’s immediate? Is it something that would, in fact, have any kind of conditionality to it? There has been some very interesting amnesties in various countries around the world where those persons who receive amnesty either have to, for example, tell the full truth about what they’re involved in, and I’m sure you’re all most familiar with the South African example in that respect. Or in other cases, one receives amnesty with a condition attached in terms of your future behavior and even in the context of Northern Ireland, and of course, my colleague here, the panelist, is in a much better place to speak to this. But those who were given pardons and released from jail, that was also in a sense a license that was attached to conditionalities on future behavior. Now, these kinds of models are not appropriate in every context and I’m not trying to prescribe that for Thailand, but perhaps I am trying to suggest that the technicalities and, now today, the sophistication that we’ve seen in different kinds of amnesty legislation around the world, it’s a bit of a different game than where we were even a few years ago. There has been some very interesting work. There are some very interesting models. The difficulties that you’re confronting today, I think, are to be expected. What’s important is that there is a conversation around that, that there’s a very thorough looking at exactly what would be covered there and that it’s something that seems to serve the national interest as a whole. I know here, perhaps as a final remark, one could identify different categories of persons or acts that might be covered; persons that were involved in protests, and may have charges just from being involved in the protest at the time, several years ago; persons that perhaps took part in property crimes such as arson; or persons that took part in weapons-related crimes. Now within that, some people may have been involved in human rights abuses. And I think the critique from experts from the international level has meant to say that international guidelines would be very clear that human rights abusers should not generally receive amnesty. But that really doesn’t answer, to end where I began, that really doesn’t answer some other bigger questions. That doesn’t necessarily mean that other kinds of crimes should or shouldn’t receive an amnesty. That is entirely a national question. It may or may not be appropriate but what’s important is that there’s a full discussion about exactly how far that should extend.
Thank you.

Moderator: (2.27.54hr)
Thank you, and now we come back to Mr. Blair, I think we have to address this question.
The international situation is precarious now, with, looming response to Syria. So you’ve been involved with this. There’s a question here, let just call here a reporter from the Nation Multimedia Group, Juarawee Kittisilpa.

Juarawee Kittisilpa :
My question is actually directed to the former British PM. What is your view towards the Syrian situation? Recently you wrote about intervention is bloody but standing aside is far worse. Could you explain more about your views in that sense, is it more like you think, is it more like you supporting the US sending the troops in more. Thank you.

Moderator:
Before you answer Mr. Blair, sorry I’m sorry.

Blair:
Before, I was just gonna say before I answer, I’m not going to answer. I think it would best to keep this on reconciliation. I’m very happy to talk another time on Syria.

Moderator:
Alright, point was taken. I think we respect that. I recognize Khun Prida Tiasuwan for your very short point. Please go ahead.

K.Prida Tiasuwan:
Question to Mr. Blair. I always remember your good job in the first Blair dealing with the IRA situation. I was in the middle of it. Basically trying to make sure that where I’m going, I’m not hitting into the middle of the bomb planted by the IRA. So I’ve always remembered what you have done there.
I also remember that Reverend Ian Paisley was so, so anguished, the language that was used was so hard. How did you get him to come around. I mean, let’s have two most important factors that got Ian Paisley to eventually come around?  Thank you.

Mr. Blair:
Thank you. It’s such a very good question. I think that I and many other people did it. But I did it in two ways I think. The first is the constant process of engagement and so to establish an actual personal relationship. Because, you know he could be very tough to deal with. So that personal relationship became important. But secondly, if you want  reconciliation, you do have to try and create, this is something we haven’t spoken about so far but I think it’s important, you have to try and create an atmosphere, which has some stability in it, and where people can relax enough to do give and take. You know, just reflecting on what Priscilla was saying just a moment or two ago, amnesty and so on, I mean, the issue with a lot of these things is: do people feel it’s an objective process? Or is there something going on behind it? In order to get them to accept a process, whether it’s an amnesty or a part of a reconciliation, you need an atmosphere in which people start to want to come together a little bit. And that’s why I think, you know, what President Ahtisaari was saying earlier is very important, ‘sometimes you can begin with things that aren’t directly about the issues you need to reconcile’. So you may begin with things that, for example, one thing we did in Northern Ireland, was, we got some common agreement over what we wanted for the Northern Ireland economy. Both of them wanted jobs for their young people. Both of them wanted improvements in education, which, by the way I think is fundamentally important in all of this. So we were able to start establishing through that those, what I would call, bridge heads, to a better atmosphere through that type of policy work. One other thing just thrown because I’m not going to get another chance, everyone is always very nervous in involving outside people. And as I say, in the end, you’ve got to do it yourselves. The only thing I’m saying, that in my own experience, is that from time to time, outsiders can help by just creating that sense of objectivity in any activity. So when I, us, President Ahtisaari along with the South African Cyril Ramaphosa, the question was: were the IRA disarming? If we said they were, people wouldn’t believe this. If they said they were, people wouldn’t believe this. The other lot could never say that they weren’t because they just could not say they weren’t. So we brought in two respected people from the outside, who other people were gonna find hard to dispute their findings. This is being authenticated as it were by some respected people. I think there were, you know, sometimes with this process of reconciliation. Sometimes the best way to start it is not you know, head on, but in ways which you create stepping stones to a process that is credible.
Moderator:
Thank you. We’ll take two broad questions now. First from Khun Nicha Hiranburana Thuvatham, she is a wife of a colonel who lost his life during the confrontation that we had. This was in April 2010.

Mrs. Nicha Hiranburana Thuvatham :
Thank you very much. I would like to ask H.E. Mr. Tony Blair that in the case of Thailand,
the government itself is the party concerned to the incident in 2010. So how should the government take role to build trust in this case. And if, maybe a question to Ms. Priscilla Hayner, if it happens to be that the government’s priority still insists to push the Amnesty Bill to the Parliament without listening to those who don’t agree, could you please foresee or forecast for us what’s gonna happen, considering your experience from other countries. Thank you.

Moderator :
Thank you. Let me take one more from Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi -  a question about our democratic institutions, seen as out of sync, not in balance. We have a very strong executive, dysfunctional, non-performing legislative branch and sometimes they’re seen as abusive of their electoral mandate, very strong electoral mandate. So over the years we’ve had an assertive military and an activist judiciary. So this question has to do with, how to regain our balance among the democratic institutions.

Ms. Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi :
Thank you very much Ajarn Thitinan. This question, I think, is related to the speech made by Mr. Blair about the judiciary. In the case where the judiciary system seems, like the objectiveness of the judiciary seems to be questionable, it can also obstruct the reconciliation process, initiated by the government or other parties. So especially in the case where the judiciary tries to overturn the decisions made by the government or the parliament, which seems to establish more connection to the people, what do you think about this case or what should be the solution for this case? Thank you.

Moderator:
So these two questions are open for the panel. Starting with you, perhaps, Mr. Blair?

Blair:
First of all, in respect to the first question, I can’t say how sorry I am for your loss. I understand why the feelings of anyone who has lost a loved one in what happened in 2010, those feelings would be very deep. I, having dealt with similar types of situations not just only in the context of Northern Ireland but elsewhere, part of the purpose of a truthful for reconciliation commission, as I understand, is trying to describe those events in which the people at least feel that they had been heard and listened to. Part of the difficulty is that, I think again we agreed on this, you can’t forget the past and it’s completely unreasonable for the victims of any tragic events such as those that happened in 2010. You can’t expect them to forget what has happened. You’ve got to listen and to hear the victims.

At the same time, and this was the hardest thing I had to do in Northern Ireland, is saying to people ‘but we have to find a way for the future that allows those things not to happen again’. And, but this will never happen unless the voices of the victims are heard, respected and listened to. In respect of what you were talking about the feelings that the elected officers weren’t delivering. By the way, this isn’t exclusively Thai problem. I can tell you. You’d find that said by most public about most of the elected officials, although as I always say you elected them in the end. But I think, and that’s why I say, that the policy agenda for change and improvement in the country is a very very important part of reigniting trust in the whole political process. And look, part of the trouble with modern politics is that it’s conducted in a very harsh environment. The media tends to be very, can be very partisan. Social media has actually multiplied the noise in which politics is conducted. And here’s the other thing that I always say to other people, politics is actually a tough business. You know everyone likes to complain about the politicians, but actually, it’s tough. You know the issues are tough. One of the things people used to say to me when I was the Prime Minister, is they used to say ‘listen to the people!’. And I would say,’ I am listening, but they’re saying different things’. So you can listen to the people but it doesn’t help you in the end. Make up your mind. You’ve got to lead. And I think, one of the important things, today, is that politicians have to communicate with their people in a far deeper and more open way than before. Because the public, you know the old days, in our system, I suspect the same in yours, the political leaders would say something and the public would, sort of, well, ok and go along with that. It doesn’t happen anymore. Everyone has got an opinion and the political leaders have got to absorb that, but still give leadership. So I think that relationship is very, very important. And the institutions that therefore govern politics, including the judiciary, coming to the question that was asked, have got to be objective. There’s no secret about the rule of law. I mean, the rule of law works on the basis that it is objective. If it’s not perceived as objective, or is not objective, you’ve got a problem. And then what happens is that, then that reduces the level of people’s trust in the institutions. I have to say I’m not an expert in the Thai judiciary, I don’t want to comment on it at all. Because I’m not qualified to. But, you know, I know in my own situation in the UK, the independence of the judiciary and its genuine impartiality is a vital part of our democracy functioning.  If that wasn’t there, you know, people would feel I’m taking to the street, because I can’t get redressed properly. So that is you know, an absolutely vital part of the picture, and where, I think, you know one thing I would say about, international experience is I think Priscilla is absolutely right. When it comes to something like the amnesty, frankly, each situation is very different. It’s quite hard to draw up some very independent rules. In other areas, it’s not. And the rule of law is one of them. Those rules are clear. They just need to be applied and that’s why sometimes what helps in these processes is when you have to set up a framework for the future, you know, and I have to do this constantly because we were changing the institutions in Northern Ireland all the time. We had to change the police. We had to change the judiciary because they were all regarded as the property of one side or another. We had to change the system of government. We had to make major institutional change. And on each occasion what we did was we said, here is international experience, and we’re gonna apply it.

And that was the only way of getting out of, what would otherwise be a situation where people would say, well, one side would say you’re pulling the wool over our eyes here. You say you’re, creating new institutions but it’s a front for something else. The only way of overcoming that is for us to say, well, here’s international practice you’re gonna apply. And that’s, I’d say a limited way I think but important way you can reach for lessons abroad.

Moderator:
Thank you, before Mr. Ahtisaari gives his answer, we have a lot of questions here about what should Thailand do, how could your insights and experiences benefit Thailand. And I know this is very directed perhaps outside the scope of your preparation. But in your reflection perhaps you can reflect or you can touch as much as you feel appropriate about the south and the question about your experiences in Aceh. And how it might be applied and what lessons could tease out for the Southern Malay and Muslim insurgencies in the Southern most premises of Thailand.

Mr. Ahtisaari :
Before I try to say something on that, it perhaps useful to remind that once long time ago Prime Minister Juncker from Luxembourg said about politicians. He said “we politicians, in most cases we know what to do. But we have not yet found out the way how to be reelected if we do or should be done” So that’s perhaps something to be kept in mind.

I think the important thing is that in every situation whether we talk about southern Thailand or not Thailand at all is that government really should make a very clear commitment that it wants to start talking with those adversaries in that part of the country, and try to find out and thoroughly study also what the expectations on both sides are.

I can tell you from Aceh negotiations, I learnt a lot from that. Because GAM wanted independent Aceh and Indonesian government would not have given that. They said we want to keep you as special autonomy that was already the law on that and that could be then improved. I had never met anybody from GAM in my life. I knew that leadership was living in Stockholm. I invited them to see me. And I told them that look, I don’t think any harm is done that we sit here and I am prepared to help you. And see what the government is prepared to offer you. If you don’t like what the government is offering you because it is definitely not going to be independence, you can go back to Sweden and live your life there and die there. Sweden is not the bad place to live. In the end they said they are coming. That sounds clearly in all those earlier answers that I gave from tsunami and earlier negotiations that attempts have been made. But I think both sides have to be serious because it is very difficult to engage as a government if the other side continues with what they have been doing in the past. That makes it, very often, nearly impossible the start the process. It requires informal consultations and that’s normally the type of thing that can only be done by nationals. The outsiders can be consulted on what we have learnt from other experiences but we can’t be running those. It is a national task always.

Moderator :
Thank you. Ms. Hayner?

Ms. Hayner :
Yes, thank you, the question put to me was what will happen if the amnesty bill which is currently been debated in the parliament does go through of course I can’t know the answer to that nor would I try to guess. I think that will depend on two things; one is the content of the final amnesty if that does go through and the second is the process to get there.

I know that the subject of amnesty has been stated very clearly repeatedly in the press by the Opposition Party as one of their high priorities for attention and discussion. And in fact linking a better process around and propose the amnesty to engagement and various reconciliation initiatives by the government. I think that tells us a lot as to the importance of this issue obviously. And that isn’t new to people here. But I wonder since I am really not the person to try to answer these questions. Since Thitinan, you mentioned that there are some representative associated with the Opposition Party here where they might be useful or appropriate to ask them to give comments as well on some of the issue we are discussing. Thank you.

Moderator :
We can take a quick comment, we are running out of time but I would yield the floor to anyone from the Democrat party or the minority voices that are not as well represented here.

Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, please. I’m sorry to have to ask you to be concise.


Dr. Surin Pitsuwan :
Thank you very very much, I will be concise. I am not here as a representative of the Democrat party. I am here on my own and very much appreciative of all the wisdom that have been shared with us by the distinguished speakers. Now let me just refer to that particular issue, my sense is that the request for the delay or the request for the withdrawal of that particular item from the agenda of the parliament was in itself a test of good will. You were talking about a long process to build this trust. President Ahtisaari talked about trust. Prime Minister Blair talked about the need to have an effective political democratic framework in order to implement the reconciliation process. Now I think that was one task that I think the opposition or the people on the other side were looking for that it should not be rushed and that exactly, Priscilla, your point, should not be rushed. (It’s) not a goal, a process and let everybody take part in that process and first it has to be recognized that there will be some need for give and take, some need for accommodation. And I think that, on that side, they are not seeing what is coming. So the division continues.

Now, all three of you were talking about not outsourcing this kind of thing to anybody else from outside. All three of you were talking about the rule and principles and the substance, Prime Minister Blair, of democracy. The question is this; this country is not divided by just two parties: The government and the opposition like in any other effective form of democratic governance. It is being influenced. It has been powerfully influenced from outside through Skype. I mean it has been frustrating to all people inside, who have been exactly what you were trying to say; try to come to term with each other, try to build that middle ground, try to visualize that future that you can share and it has to be a better future. But every time they started this, there is an interference from outside. You have been candid, Mr. moderator, and I think that serves this function very well. And I think all the three speakers have been very very candid and I think we have to be candid this is one malice that somehow affects our determination to reconcile with each other; interference from outside. Now you need to recognize this fact. You need to give it a serious consideration what to do.

My question is, in your experiences, all three speakers, have you seen, have you had any cases, in any country, as a country being run not by the two parties inside, opposition and government but it is externally influenced from outside. Respectfully asking the question, thank you very much.

Moderator :
Thank you, Thank you.
As you can see, our former secretary general of the ASEAN is always flamboyance and articulate. He said he is not from democrat party but in fact this is the view that is very much consonant with what the Democrats were saying. It very much reflects our majority-minority dilemmas. So here we have the minority view that thinks that the outside interference is a problem. Majority thinks the outside is the inside. The outside interference is the real leader that they voted for. Hence our division continues.  I know time is running out we can continue this over lunch.

When I began this endeavor, I know it that there are risks for you too to come to tell Thailand what to do. This is the big risk. And you didn’t do that, you didn’t even talk about Syria. And you both have been involved in TRTC and we really appreciate your efforts. I know that we couldn’t be worse off, right? I mean we divided, if we have this forum, you say what you were saying. If in a passing day, passing comments inconsequential then we wouldn’t be worse off. We’ve already divided and this been prolonged and protracted. On the other hand, I think that we have ended up on the outside today because what you have said is very much the problems that we have from your reflectiond, majority, minority that dealing with the past, must not be done at the expense of the future. The future has to be shared. It has to be a sense of shared opportunity. Many other questions, by the way, I have to apologize that we couldn’t take them all. Broadly speaking, I want to thank all of you for sharing your thought. This is not a panacea, this is a not one-size-fits-all exercise and it is not the last speaking series. We are still in the process of trying to bridge this gap and so far not so successful, minority won’t play, majority wins and know that it is winning, so it tries to close out the game. And somehow we have to envision a new common future that all will play by the rule and the winners respect the losers and all voices somehow are taken into account.

So thank you very much Mr. Blair, Mr. Ahtisaari and Ms. Hayner. Now we have lunch, you are all welcome to lunch. In the afternoon we actually have a stimulating discussion with the key experts. And we also will have table. Actually, it is going to be the real seminar. You are all welcome to that after lunch, thank you.